

Implementing Regional Early Warning Policy to Sustain Social Stability in North Minahasa Regency, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

The study addresses the need for a more effective early detection and early prevention system in a socially plural district whose stability is strategically important for governance, investment, tourism, and intergroup harmony. Using a qualitative descriptive design, the original thesis collected data through in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis involving officials of the Regional National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol), the Early Warning Community Forum (FKDM), interfaith actors, security institutions, district-level officials, and community leaders. The present article reorganizes the thesis into a full academic journal article and highlights the empirical findings through adapted tables and thesis-based figures. The findings indicate that the early warning policy has been implemented, but its performance remains suboptimal. Institutionally, Kesbangpol has carried out coordination, early detection, conflict mapping, and communication functions. However, implementation is constrained by limited human resources, insufficient budget, weak cross-sector coordination, limited analytical capacity, uneven public participation, and the absence of an integrated digital information system. The role of FKDM as a strategic community partner also remains underdeveloped due to limited training and operational support. At the same time, the policy benefits from several supportive factors, including local government commitment, a relatively strong regulatory foundation, collaboration with TNI and Police, the influence of community and religious leaders, and local socio-cultural values emphasizing solidarity. The article argues that policy strengthening should move beyond formal compliance toward a collaborative, capacity-building, and digital governance model. It proposes an integrated strengthening strategy that combines institutional clarification, competency development, community-based reporting, and digital early warning infrastructure. The study contributes to public administration literature by showing that regional early warning policy in

plural local settings is not only a matter of legal design, but of implementation capacity, trust, inter-organizational coordination, and the ability to translate preventive governance into routine practice.

Keywords: Collaborative Governance, Early Warning Policy, Kesbangpol, North Minahasa, Policy Implementation, Regional Early Awareness, Social Conflict.

INTRODUCTION

In many decentralized settings, the success of public policy is determined less by the elegance of regulation than by the ability of local institutions to translate legal mandates into coordinated, routine, and trusted practice. This is especially true for preventive governance policies that are meant to operate before crisis fully appears. Early warning in the regional governance context is one of those policy domains. It is designed not simply to react to conflict after damage has occurred, but to detect indications of tension, map possible risks, mobilize communication channels, and create institutional readiness for early prevention. Yet such a mandate is complex. It requires accurate information, clear role distribution, inter-agency trust, public legitimacy, responsive leadership, and a level of institutional learning that many local governments still struggle to sustain.

North Minahasa Regency provides an important case for examining these issues. The regency occupies a strategic position in North Sulawesi because it lies between Manado, the provincial capital, and Bitung, a major port and industrial city. The district also has growing economic importance through investment expansion and tourism development, including the wider strategic area related to Likupang. At the same time, North Minahasa is socially plural. It is marked by ethnic, religious, occupational, and territorial diversity that enriches local life but also creates the possibility of tension when governance is weak, socio-economic interests collide, or political communication deteriorates. In such a setting, regional stability is not an automatic outcome of diversity. It must be cultivated through institutions capable of early detection, mediation, and collaborative prevention.

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 2 of 2018, later adjusted through Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 46 of 2019, provides a regulatory framework for early warning in the regions. The regulation positions local government as a key actor in detecting, identifying, assessing, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting information concerning threats, challenges, obstacles, and disturbances that may disrupt social and political stability. At the local level, Kesbangpol is expected to play a major coordinating role, supported by the Regional Government Early Warning Team and community-based forums such as FKDM. In theory, such a system should connect state institutions and citizens in a preventive network. In practice, however, implementation often becomes uneven. Formal structures may exist, while operational integration remains weak.

The thesis by Sammy C. S. Rompis begins from this gap between regulation and practice. It observes that early warning in North Minahasa has been carried out, but not yet in a fully integrated or effective manner. The district has experienced social tensions and conflict risks in several areas, including those related to economic competition, land use, mining disputes, and localized intergroup friction. These experiences indicate the importance of a functioning early warning system. They also expose the costs of delayed detection, fragmented reporting, or weak coordination. If preventive governance is supposed to anticipate such dynamics, then the question is not whether the policy exists, but whether it works as intended.

The policy problem is therefore both practical and analytical. Practically, the regional government needs a reliable system capable of supporting security, investment continuity, social harmony, and public confidence. Analytically, the case offers an opportunity to examine how implementation unfolds in a plural local context where administrative capacity, social capital, and inter-organizational relationships all influence policy outcomes. The thesis frames this issue in terms of implementation and determinant factors. This article extends that effort by reorganizing the thesis into a full journal manuscript modeled after the structure of the Rizki article provided by the user, while preserving the empirical core of the original work.

This journal article has three main aims. First, it analyzes how the regional early warning policy has been implemented by the Government of North Minahasa through Kesbangpol and related stakeholders. Second, it identifies determinant factors shaping the effectiveness and limits of implementation, including institutional support, human resource capacity, information systems, coordination, and community participation. Third, it formulates a strengthening strategy grounded in collaborative governance, capacity building, and digitalization. By doing so, the article presents the early warning policy not as a narrow security procedure, but as a broader governance arrangement linking public administration, social trust, conflict prevention, and adaptive state capacity.

The article is significant in several respects. For public administration scholarship, it adds an empirical case of local policy implementation in a preventive governance domain. For local government practice, it provides a diagnostic and strategic account of where implementation has advanced and where it remains fragile. For broader policy debate, it demonstrates that early warning is not only about technical intelligence gathering; it also depends on organizational design, legal operationalization, community partnership, and the capacity to combine formal structures with local knowledge. In regions characterized by pluralism and rapid development, such integration becomes increasingly important.

The argument developed here is that the implementation of regional early warning policy in North Minahasa should be understood as ‘adequately implemented but not yet optimal.’ The policy has produced institutional activity and some preventive effects, but it has not yet evolved into a robust, data-informed, community-linked system of anticipatory governance. The remainder of the article develops this argument through a theoretical framework, a description of the qualitative method, a findings section enriched with thesis-based tables and figures, and a discussion that proposes a strengthened model of collaborative and digital early warning governance.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Policy implementation theory provides the core analytical foundation for this study. Public policy, in its most basic sense, refers to what government chooses to do or not to do in relation to public problems. Within that broad field, implementation occupies a crucial position because it is the stage at which normative intention is translated into administrative and social reality. A policy may be formally legitimate and politically endorsed, yet still fail to generate meaningful results if implementation systems are weak. For this reason, implementation analysis is concerned with the dynamic relationship among policy content, institutions, actors, context, and outcomes.

The thesis draws on a range of classical and contemporary implementation perspectives, and

these remain useful for the present article. Anderson's understanding of policy process highlights implementation as the stage where adopted policy is carried out by designated units through the mobilization of resources. This perspective is valuable because regional early warning is not an abstract doctrine; it must be operationalized through meetings, reporting, analysis, communication, and coordinated action. If those processes do not occur consistently, then the policy remains symbolic. The Andersonian lens therefore helps frame implementation as an applied administrative process rather than a purely formal legal status.

Van Meter and Van Horn offer one of the most influential frameworks for analyzing implementation performance. Their model emphasizes several variables: policy standards and objectives, resources, characteristics of implementing agencies, inter-organizational communication, dispositions of implementers, and the wider social, political, and economic environment. This framework aligns closely with the North Minahasa case. The policy standards are present in the ministerial regulation, but translation into local standard operating procedures remains incomplete. Resources are limited, especially human resources, training, and operating funds. The implementing agency, Kesbangpol, has formal authority but still faces fragmentation in its relationships with other institutions. Communication occurs, but not always in integrated or data-based form. The surrounding environment is socially plural, politically dynamic, and strategically sensitive for investment and tourism. The framework thus provides a strong diagnostic tool for locating where implementation gains and deficits occur.

Edward III complements this analysis by focusing on communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. These four variables are particularly relevant when studying why implementation remains suboptimal despite the existence of legal authority. Communication matters because early warning depends on speed, clarity, and coordination across institutional levels and social actors. Resources matter because even the best-designed policy cannot operate effectively when budgets, personnel, equipment, and information systems are inadequate. Disposition matters because the commitment, alertness, and initiative of implementers shape whether policy routines become active or passive. Bureaucratic structure matters because fragmented responsibilities, unclear procedures, and weak standardization can produce delay and inconsistency. In the North Minahasa case, all four issues are visible, which is why Edward III's framework remains analytically productive.

The article also benefits from the distinction between top-down and bottom-up implementation approaches associated with Sabatier and later implementation scholars. A top-down lens is visible in the ministerial regulation and district-level institutional design: the policy defines structures, responsibilities, and objectives from above. Yet regional early warning cannot succeed through hierarchical command alone. It depends on community observation, local trust, and informal channels of information that operate from below. In other words, early warning is inherently hybrid. It requires state direction but also bottom-up signal production. This makes the case particularly suitable for a collaborative governance interpretation.

Collaborative governance, as articulated by Ansell and Gash, emphasizes the structured engagement of public institutions with non-state actors in collective decision making and joint problem solving. Although the early warning policy is not framed exclusively in collaborative governance terms, its practical logic strongly points in that direction. FKDM, interfaith networks, local leaders, district officials, police, military representatives, and Kesbangpol all hold pieces of the information and legitimacy needed for effective prevention. If these actors operate in isolation, the system becomes

slower, more fragmented, and less trusted. If they operate collaboratively, local knowledge, authority, and response capacity can be combined. The thesis therefore correctly identifies collaboration as more than a supporting condition; it is part of the policy's operational logic.

Dunn's perspective on policy systems also helps illuminate the case because it treats policy as an interaction among policy content, policy actors, and policy environment. Regional early warning is not implemented in a vacuum. The local environment includes plural social identities, changing economic interests, political competition, investment expansion, and historical experiences of tension. Such contextual conditions do not automatically determine policy outcomes, but they shape what kinds of signals matter, what kinds of preventive communication are needed, and how much trust exists between institutions and communities. Dunn's emphasis on policy environment therefore broadens the study beyond bureaucratic procedure and links implementation to the specific social texture of North Minahasa.

The concept of regional early warning itself must also be clarified. Under the Indonesian regulatory framework, early warning in the region refers to systematic efforts by local government, intelligence elements, and society to detect, identify, assess, analyze, interpret, and present information aimed at preventing and handling threats, challenges, obstacles, and disturbances that may disrupt regional stability, public order, or national integrity. This definition matters because it reveals that early warning is not merely information gathering. It includes interpretation, coordination, and preventive response. The quality of implementation therefore depends on whether institutions can transform scattered information into actionable collective awareness.

From this standpoint, the role of Kesbangpol is central but not singular. Kesbangpol functions as an institutional node rather than as a solitary actor. It must coordinate with district government leadership, security institutions, subdistrict authorities, community organizations, and informal leaders. This coordination challenge raises questions of governance capacity. Governance capacity here refers to the ability of institutions to align authority, information, resources, and participation around a shared public purpose. The thesis demonstrates that legal authority alone does not generate such capacity. Instead, capacity emerges when institutional design, trained personnel, communication routines, and public trust reinforce one another.

Technology governance is another theoretical layer. The thesis notes the weakness of manual reporting and the absence of an integrated information platform. In the current administrative environment, preventive governance increasingly depends on digital support for data gathering, monitoring, archiving, analysis, and cross-sector coordination. Heeks's work on e-government is relevant here because it shows that digital systems can strengthen state capacity only when information practices, institutional incentives, and user readiness are aligned. A digital early warning platform cannot replace human judgment or community knowledge, but it can improve timeliness, traceability, and coordination if introduced as part of a broader governance reform.

Social capital theory, especially as discussed by Putnam, also enriches the analysis. Social capital refers to networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. In North Minahasa, local values of solidarity, togetherness, and the active role of religious and community figures constitute an important reservoir of social capital. The thesis identifies this as one of the strongest supporting factors for policy implementation. Yet social capital is not automatically mobilized. Institutions must cultivate, respect, and integrate it. If communities feel ignored, distrusted, or excluded, then social capital cannot easily be converted into preventive action.

Combining these perspectives, the study adopts an integrated analytical position. Implementation effectiveness is shaped by the interaction of formal policy design, institutional capacity, resources, organizational relationships, socio-cultural context, and public participation. A region may possess legal clarity but lack operational coherence. It may possess social capital but lack digital infrastructure. It may possess committed officials but insufficient training and budget. The North Minahasa case illustrates precisely this kind of partial capacity. The policy is present and active, yet still semi-optimal because multiple implementation variables remain underdeveloped.

The theoretical implication is that regional early warning should be understood as a policy field at the intersection of public administration, security governance, and collaborative local development. It is not reducible to intelligence work, and it is not adequately explained by a single-variable model. Instead, it depends on integrated implementation. This article therefore interprets the thesis findings through a multidimensional framework in which standards, resources, institutions, communication, environment, collaboration, trust, and digital systems jointly shape whether early warning remains procedural or becomes genuinely preventive.

METHOD

The article is based on a qualitative descriptive study originally conducted in North Minahasa Regency. The qualitative approach was selected because the research sought to understand how a policy is implemented in practice, how actors interpret their responsibilities, what obstacles they encounter, and how contextual conditions shape operational outcomes. A descriptive qualitative design was appropriate because the study did not aim to test a statistical relationship, but to generate an in-depth and context-sensitive account of implementation processes and determinant factors.

The main research site was the Regional National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) of North Minahasa Regency, supported by field engagement with related stakeholders involved in early warning and conflict prevention. The study focused on two broad questions: how the regional early warning policy was implemented and what determinant factors affected its implementation. Sub-focuses covered institutional implementation, obstacles, supporting factors, and the role of community participation and stakeholder coordination.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis. Interview participants included the Secretary of Kesbangpol, the Head of the Division for National Vigilance and Conflict Handling, the Chair of FKDM, a representative of the interfaith forum, representatives from Police and military structures, a district head, and a community leader. These participants were selected purposively because they held strategic roles or relevant experiential knowledge concerning early warning implementation. Observation was used to understand the practical environment of coordination and communication, while documentation analysis was employed to review regulations, internal records, implementation documents, and related policy materials.

The analysis followed the interactive model associated with Miles and Huberman: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. Data reduction involved classifying interview statements, observations, and documents according to implementation dimensions and determinant factors. Data display involved thematic organization and synthesis through analytical tables. Conclusions were drawn iteratively and verified through triangulation among sources and methods.

Triangulation was essential because the policy field includes multiple perspectives, and no single actor provides a complete picture of implementation reality.

The study's trustworthiness was strengthened through source triangulation, prolonged attention to the field context, and consistency between empirical description and theoretical interpretation. In the present journal article, the original thesis is reorganized into a more concise analytical form, but the substance remains rooted in the qualitative evidence generated through the thesis research. The adapted tables and figures included below are based on the thesis's original analytical materials and field documentation. See table 1.

Table 1. Research informants involved in the thesis study

No.	Informant category	Number	Representative / code
1	Secretary of Kesbangpol, North Minahasa Regency	1 person	Chresto Palandi
2	Head of Division for National Vigilance and Conflict Handling	1 person	Julius Jafan Mantiri
3	Chair of FKDM, North Minahasa Regency	1 person	Roy Maramis
4	Representative of FKUB at subdistrict level	1 person	T. I. M. Karundeng
5	Police representative	1 person	I. L. S. Taniowas
6	Military / Koramil representative	1 person	L. P. Lahama
7	Subdistrict head	1 person	Delby Wahiu
8	Community / religious / youth leader	1 person	John Katuuk

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that the implementation of the regional early warning policy in North Minahasa is neither absent nor fully effective. The policy has been operationalized through Kesbangpol's coordination role, the existence of formal legal instruments, engagement with security actors, and interaction with community-based structures such as FKDM. However, implementation remains partial and uneven. The phrase that best captures the overall condition is the one already implied by the thesis itself: the policy is adequately implemented but not yet optimal.

At the institutional level, Kesbangpol has undertaken the core functions expected of an early warning actor. These include coordinating with other agencies, mapping social conflict potential, gathering and exchanging information, and sustaining communication with security institutions and community actors. The existence of a local regulatory and administrative framework, including district-level decisions concerning early warning teams, has given implementation a degree of legitimacy and continuity. This means that the policy is not merely rhetorical. There are structures, meetings, interactions, and alertness practices in place.

Yet the findings show that the implementation system is still marked by a gap between formal design and operational integration. Policy standards exist, but technical standardization remains weak.

Communication occurs, but information flow is not always systematic, timely, or digitally supported. Institutional commitment exists, but it is constrained by resource scarcity and fragmentation. FKDM exists, but its strategic role has not been fully developed through operational support and regular training. Public participation is valued, but it remains uneven because trust and awareness vary across communities. As a result, the policy works in a semi-manual, semi-networked mode rather than as a consolidated regional system.

The first adapted thesis table clarifies this condition by summarizing the implementation profile. The matrix demonstrates that implementation problems are not isolated incidents; they reflect a cluster of mutually reinforcing weaknesses. Inadequate standardization affects coordination. Weak coordination reduces the utility of local knowledge. Limited resources weaken both reporting and community engagement. Manual reporting slows response and analysis. Underdeveloped community institutions reduce the range of preventive signals available to the state. Thus, implementation quality depends on integration across multiple dimensions.

The empirical material also suggests that North Minahasa's early warning capacity rests on a combination of formal institutions and informal relationships. Interview evidence and field observation indicate that informal communication remains highly important. Local officials, religious figures, and community actors often exchange information through personal networks rather than through a unified reporting platform. This is not entirely negative. Informal communication can be fast, trusted, and culturally appropriate. However, it is also inconsistent, difficult to archive, and vulnerable to information loss or selective transmission. A strong early warning policy needs both: trusted local relationships and a formalized system that can transform signals into coordinated action.

A second major finding concerns determinant factors. The thesis identifies four major clusters: institutional and regulatory support, technology and information infrastructure, human resource capacity, and social participation or socio-cultural conditions. These factors do not operate independently. Their significance lies in how they combine. For example, a strong legal framework cannot compensate for weak personnel capacity. Good community relations cannot fully overcome the absence of a timely reporting system. Likewise, digitalization cannot succeed without users who understand its relevance and institutions that commit resources to maintaining it.

Institutional and regulatory support is perhaps the strongest enabling factor, but it is also incomplete. On the positive side, Kesbangpol has a recognized place in the regional governance structure, and the policy benefits from a clear national legal foundation. The existence of teams and forums creates administrative pathways for implementation. However, the findings show that regulation is still more general than operational. There is no fully developed technical SOP that converts broad legal mandates into clear day-to-day routines for detection, reporting, verification, escalation, and follow-up. This weakens consistency across institutions and reduces the predictability of response.

Technology and information infrastructure constitute a second determinant cluster and one of the clearest weaknesses in the current system. The findings repeatedly note that reporting remains largely manual and that there is no fully integrated digital early warning system. This slows data transmission, reduces analytical capacity, and makes longitudinal pattern detection more difficult. In practice, delayed information can be as damaging as absent information. In a policy domain defined by early detection, the lack of digital integration is especially consequential. The thesis therefore

highlights the relevance of a web-based system such as the proposed SIKENDIS platform as a strategic future intervention.

Human resource capacity emerges as a third determinant and one of the most serious implementation constraints. The issue is not only the number of personnel, but also the depth of analytical competence. Early warning requires the ability to recognize signals, distinguish rumors from credible indicators, interpret emerging patterns, and communicate findings responsibly. The thesis found that the number of personnel is limited and that the analytical and conflict-mapping capacity of some implementers remains uneven. FKDM members, who should function as a strategic bridge between community and government, also require more sustained capacity building. Without systematic training, community-based vigilance can become passive, reactive, or overly dependent on a small number of active individuals.

The fourth determinant factor involves public participation and socio-cultural context. North Minahasa benefits from strong socio-cultural values of togetherness and from the influence of respected community and religious leaders. These factors create a reservoir of social capital that supports stability. At the same time, participation remains uneven. Some citizens still perceive security and vigilance as the exclusive responsibility of the state. Others hesitate to report issues because of fear, distrust, or uncertainty about whether reporting will matter. Thus, the policy depends on public trust but has not yet fully institutionalized the mechanisms needed to widen that trust.

Thesis-based field photographs provide additional insight into the practical nature of implementation. The policy does not operate solely through documents; it depends on face-to-face engagement with officials, community leaders, and coordinating actors across sectors. The image plate below illustrates the field-based and relational character of implementation in North Minahasa. Even in a policy domain that increasingly requires digitalization, personal interaction remains central to information exchange, interpretation, and preventive communication.

The adapted analytical tables confirm that implementation in North Minahasa can best be described as moderate or semi-optimal. The policy is functioning, but its effectiveness remains vulnerable because critical implementation variables have not matured together. Institutional presence has outpaced operational integration. Social support exists, but public participation is uneven. Legal legitimacy is strong, but technical standardization is weak. This is why the findings do not support a binary conclusion of success or failure. Instead, they point toward a transitional condition in which the policy has enough structure to operate, but not yet enough integration to perform at a consistently high level.

The findings also indicate that the policy has an important preventive value even in its current form. The existence of coordination mechanisms, the role of community and religious figures, and the continued commitment of local government contribute to a relatively stable environment that matters for regional development. This is especially important given North Minahasa's strategic relevance for investment and tourism. In that sense, the current implementation already generates value. The problem is that it does so in a manner that remains institutionally fragile, person-dependent, and insufficiently digitized. The central challenge for the future is therefore not policy initiation, but policy strengthening. See table 2, and 3.

Table 2. Analytical matrix of policy implementation in North Minahasa

Sub-focus	Problem findings	Theoretical reading and solution direction	Main sources
Level of policy implementation	Implementation is running but remains suboptimal; cross-sector coordination is inconsistent; the reporting system is not integrated; FKDM is not functioning maximally.	The condition indicates weak operational standards and incomplete implementation systems. Needed responses include technical SOPs, a digital reporting system, stronger cross-sector coordination, and FKDM capacity strengthening.	Kesbangpol secretary, division head, FKDM chair
Constraints in implementation	Human resources are limited in number and competence; budget is inadequate; coordination is not yet optimal; reporting remains manual; public participation and trust remain uneven.	The obstacles are multidimensional: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure interact. Responses should include training, budget strengthening, digitalization, institutional collaboration, and community engagement.	Kesbangpol, FKDM, FKUB
Supporting factors	Local government commitment, relatively strong regulation, cross-sector synergy, the presence of FKDM, support from community leaders, strong socio-cultural values, and effective informal communication.	These factors show the importance of structural support and social capital. Policy strengthening should preserve these advantages while making them more systematic and data-based.	Kesbangpol, community actors
Community and stakeholder participation	Citizens are a major source of information, but participation is uneven; trust is mixed; the roles of FKDM, FKUB, and religious or customary leaders are important but not fully integrated.	Implementation requires multi-actor collaboration. Responses include transparency, trust building, institutional support for community forums, and integrated community-based participation mechanisms.	Kesbangpol, FKDM, FKUB, community leaders

Table 3. Determinant factors affecting regional early warning policy implementation

Determinant factor	Empirical findings	Interpretation	Policy direction
Institutional and regulatory support	Kesbangpol, district early warning teams, and FKDM exist formally, but functional integration remains limited and local SOPs are incomplete.	Legal and structural support exist, but operational coherence is still weak.	Clarify mandates, formulate technical SOPs, and formalize coordination routines.
Technology and information infrastructure	Reporting is still largely manual; no integrated digital platform is yet operating effectively; device and network support remain limited.	Technology has become a critical resource variable in early warning implementation.	Develop a digital reporting and analysis platform and improve ICT readiness.
Human resource capacity	Personnel are limited; analytical ability in conflict mapping and social intelligence remains uneven; FKDM capacity is underdeveloped and incentives are weak.	Implementation quality depends heavily on the competence and motivation of implementers.	Provide regular training, selective recruitment or reassignment, incentives, and continuous capacity building.
Public participation and socio-cultural context	Community participation is uneven; some citizens still hesitate to report risks; community and religious leaders remain influential; solidarity values remain strong.	Trust and social capital are major enabling conditions but require institutional cultivation.	Strengthen public communication, feedback loops, and formal collaboration with community leaders and local forums.

The findings can be interpreted as evidence of partial implementation capacity. The regional early warning policy has moved beyond symbolic existence, yet it has not become a fully integrated system of anticipatory governance. This pattern is consistent with classic implementation theory. From the perspective of Van Meter and Van Horn, the North Minahasa case shows that standards and objectives are formally present, but the variables required for strong implementation are unevenly developed. Resources remain limited, communication across organizations is not fully systematized, agency characteristics reveal fragmentation, and environmental complexity continues to shape how the policy is received and enacted.

Edward III's framework sharpens this diagnosis. Communication in North Minahasa is active but still relies too heavily on informal exchange. Informality can facilitate speed and trust, but it cannot replace institutional memory, consistency, and accountability. A preventive policy that depends on informal communication alone will have difficulty generating cumulative learning. The resource variable is equally decisive. Limited personnel, budget constraints, and inadequate digital infrastructure directly weaken the policy's ability to detect and respond early. Disposition, or implementer

commitment, appears comparatively stronger; the thesis reports commitment from local government and supporting actors. Yet commitment without enabling structure produces only partial performance. Bureaucratic structure is the final challenge: coordination exists, but operational procedures remain insufficiently standardized and integrated.

The thesis's analytical tables also point toward a collaborative governance interpretation. The role of FKDM, religious actors, community leaders, and security institutions indicates that policy implementation already unfolds across a multi-actor network. However, collaboration is still unevenly institutionalized. Some parts of the network depend on personal initiative, informal trust, or intermittent coordination rather than on clearly sustained platforms of joint work. This confirms Ansell and Gash's argument that collaboration is not merely the presence of multiple actors, but a structured process of shared problem solving supported by facilitative conditions, trust building, and institutional design.

The presence of strong local socio-cultural values should be treated as a strategic asset. Putnam's concept of social capital is particularly useful here. North Minahasa possesses norms and relational resources that can support cooperation. Community solidarity, respect for local leaders, and informal communication networks can make early warning more culturally embedded and more socially legitimate. Yet social capital is not self-executing. When institutions fail to provide feedback, when reporting channels are unclear, or when public trust is weak, social capital remains underutilized. The policy challenge is therefore to translate informal social strength into formal governance effectiveness.

The absence of an integrated digital information system is especially significant from a policy systems perspective. Early warning depends on time. If signals are delayed, fragmented, or undocumented, the opportunity for early prevention narrows. The thesis clearly indicates that reporting is still largely manual. This weakens the timeliness of analysis and limits coordination across sectors. Heeks's work on e-government suggests that digital governance systems succeed only when technology, institutions, and users are aligned. North Minahasa has not yet achieved this alignment, but the policy field is ripe for it. The proposed SIKENDIS idea is therefore not a cosmetic modernization initiative; it responds directly to one of the most decisive weaknesses identified in the study.

Another important discussion point concerns the distinction between formal and functional institutional support. Formally, North Minahasa has Kesbangpol, regulatory backing, coordinating teams, and partner forums. Functionally, however, the strength of these institutions depends on whether they have sufficient resources, training, procedural clarity, and operational continuity. This explains why a region can appear well equipped on paper while still performing below potential in practice. Public administration research frequently encounters this pattern, and the present case exemplifies it well. Institutionalization is not completed when structures are created; it is completed when structures become reliable vehicles for sustained collective action.

The adapted thesis figures strengthen the discussion in two ways. The first figure, drawn from the thesis's theoretical chapter, reminds us that policy systems involve reciprocal relations among policy actors, policy content, and policy environment. The second figure, based on the Edward III model, underscores how communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure influence implementation. These figures are not decorative. They help show why the findings cluster the way they do. The North Minahasa case is not failing because of a single technical flaw. It is shaped by systemic interaction among actors, environment, and organizational conditions. See Figure 1.




Figure 1. Components of the public policy system.
 Source: thesis figure adapted from Dunn’s policy system model.

The findings also invite reflection on the meaning of ‘early warning’ in local governance. Too often, early warning is interpreted narrowly as intelligence gathering or reactive monitoring. The evidence from North Minahasa suggests a broader meaning. Early warning is a preventive governance capability. It includes observation, interpretation, communication, trust-building, institutional response, and social learning. If that broader interpretation is accepted, then capacity building becomes central. Personnel must be trained not only in reporting procedures, but also in conflict mapping, risk interpretation, mediation awareness, and cross-sector communication. FKDM members require similar support so that community participation becomes informed and durable rather than incidental. See figure 2.




Figure 2. Edward III implementation model used to interpret the thesis findings
 Source: thesis figure presenting the Edward III implementation variables

The policy implications are substantial. First, North Minahasa should not abandon its current early warning structures; it should strengthen and integrate them. Second, strengthening should focus on operational clarity, not only additional regulation. Technical SOPs, role distribution, escalation protocols, and reporting templates are needed to convert general policy into routine action. Third, digitalization should be embedded within collaborative governance rather than treated as a separate technical project. A digital platform without institutional commitment will become inactive;

institutional commitment without data systems will remain slow and fragmented. Fourth, community participation should be supported by feedback loops that make reporting meaningful. Citizens and local leaders are more likely to engage when they see that information leads to response.

The case also contributes to wider debates about local state capacity in plural societies. Diversity by itself does not produce instability, but diversity under conditions of weak coordination and delayed response can heighten vulnerability. In this sense, the regional early warning policy serves both security and development functions. It helps preserve social order, but it also protects the conditions needed for investment confidence, tourism growth, and public trust in government. The thesis is therefore correct to position early warning as a strategic local governance issue rather than as a marginal administrative function.

Finally, the discussion suggests that the North Minahasa case is best interpreted as a policy still in the consolidation stage. It has passed the point of initial formal adoption, but it has not yet achieved mature implementation. Consolidation requires institutional memory, regularized coordination, competency development, digitized information flow, and broader public ownership. The transition from adequate to effective implementation will depend on whether local government can move from person-dependent practices toward system-dependent governance while still preserving the social trust and local flexibility that currently help sustain the policy.

Proposed Strengthening Strategy

Based on the thesis findings and the foregoing discussion, a strengthened implementation strategy can be proposed. The strategy is not a replacement for the current policy framework, but an effort to deepen its operational capacity. It rests on four pillars.

First, institutional strengthening and procedural clarification are essential. Kesbangpol should lead the development of technical SOPs that specify how signals are reported, verified, classified, escalated, and followed up. The role of the Regional Government Early Warning Team, FKDM, subdistrict authorities, and partner institutions should be described clearly so that coordination becomes less dependent on informal initiative alone. Regular coordination forums should be formalized with agendas focused on preventive governance rather than only ceremonial exchange.

Second, capacity building should become a routine component of implementation. Training is needed for Kesbangpol staff, FKDM members, and related local actors in conflict mapping, social communication, preventive analysis, report writing, and public engagement. Capacity building should be continuous rather than ad hoc. A tiered model could be used in which core personnel receive advanced analytical training while community-level actors receive practical modules in signal identification, reporting ethics, and communication pathways.

Third, digital governance should be developed as an enabling system. A regional early warning information platform, as envisioned through the SIKENDIS concept, could improve reporting timeliness, data archiving, case mapping, and inter-agency access. The platform should remain simple enough for local use but robust enough to support pattern recognition and coordination. Digitalization should include not only software development, but also device readiness, connectivity support, user training, data protocols, and clear responsibility for maintenance.

Fourth, public trust and participation should be strengthened through community-based governance. Citizens, religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth actors, and local organizations should be positioned not as peripheral observers but as active contributors to preventive governance. This

requires socialization, transparency, and feedback. Reporting channels should be known to the public. Communities should understand what kinds of information matter and how government will respond. Partnerships with FKUB, community leaders, and village-level structures can help turn social capital into organized vigilance without securitizing everyday community life.

Taken together, these four pillars point toward an integrated model of collaborative and digital early warning governance. Such a model would preserve the relational strengths already evident in North Minahasa while reducing fragmentation, delay, and ambiguity. Its goal is not to bureaucratize all local relationships, but to ensure that the regional government has a durable and responsive preventive capability grounded in both institutional discipline and social legitimacy. See table 4.

Table 4. Integrated strengthening strategy for regional early warning governance

Strategic pillar	Main action	Expected institutional effect	Expected policy effect
Institutional clarification	Formulate technical SOPs, annual coordination plans, and clearer task distribution among Kesbangpol, teams, and community forums.	Lower fragmentation and stronger accountability.	More consistent detection, escalation, and preventive action.
Capacity building	Regular training in conflict analysis, reporting, social communication, and community facilitation for officials and FKDM members.	Higher competence and better implementer confidence.	Improved analytical quality and more credible early warning signals.
Digital early warning system	Develop SIKENDIS-style digital reporting and monitoring with user training and maintenance support.	Faster information flow, better archiving, and more timely coordination.	Earlier detection and better inter-agency response.
Community-linked collaboration	Strengthen partnerships with FKUB, religious leaders, customary actors, youth groups, and village-level institutions.	More trust, broader information sources, and stronger legitimacy.	Wider participation and stronger social prevention capacity.

Practical and Scholarly Implications

The case of North Minahasa offers several practical implications for district governments that operate in socially diverse and strategically sensitive settings. The first implication is that early warning should be budgeted and managed as an essential governance function rather than as a peripheral activity attached to general political administration. Preventive governance is often undervalued because its success is measured by the absence of visible crisis rather than by dramatic outputs. Yet the

ability to prevent escalation, reduce uncertainty, and preserve public trust is itself a strategic public value. District governments that neglect this function often discover its importance only after conflict, panic, or reputational damage has already occurred.

A second implication concerns inter-agency learning. The North Minahasa thesis suggests that collaboration with police, military, interfaith actors, and local leaders already exists, but still needs to be converted into a more routine architecture of shared vigilance. This has relevance far beyond the local case. In many districts, coordination becomes intense only when specific events force actors together. Preventive governance requires the opposite sequence: institutions should learn to work together before crisis intensifies. Regular joint review forums, simulation exercises, cross-sector briefings, and shared digital reporting protocols can help create this anticipatory habit of cooperation.

A third implication concerns legitimacy. Early warning policies can easily be misunderstood if they are communicated only as security surveillance. In plural local settings, legitimacy depends on whether citizens experience the system as a mechanism of protection, mediation, and social care rather than mere monitoring. For that reason, socialization should emphasize conflict prevention, public order, and peaceful community life. Community leaders, youth networks, and village-level actors should be engaged not simply to report problems, but to co-produce social calm and local trust. This broader framing makes early warning more acceptable and more resilient.

The study also has implications for public administration scholarship. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of classical implementation theory while also showing the need to update implementation analysis with collaborative and digital dimensions. Van Meter and Van Horn, Edward III, and Dunn remain highly useful because their core variables still explain much of what happens in the field. However, contemporary preventive governance also depends on digital information flow, platform readiness, and public trust across formal and informal networks. Thus, local implementation studies increasingly benefit from combining classical implementation frameworks with collaborative governance and digital governance perspectives.

Finally, the article underlines an important methodological lesson. Policy implementation studies gain depth when they connect formal regulation to actual field relationships and documentary practice. The addition of thesis-based tables and figures in this article helps make visible what is often hidden in summary conclusions: implementation is a patterned but uneven process shaped by institutions, people, relationships, and tools. That insight is valuable for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers alike.

In addition, the North Minahasa case demonstrates that preventive policy effectiveness should be judged not only by crisis response but also by the quality of routine preparedness. A district may appear calm on the surface while still lacking reliable information channels, trained personnel, or coordinated procedures. Routine preparedness includes updated contact networks, clear reporting chains, shared interpretation standards, documentation discipline, and the confidence of community actors to participate without fear. These routine elements are easy to overlook because they are administrative rather than dramatic, yet they often determine whether early warning works when pressure rises.

The article therefore supports a broader rethinking of local security-related policy implementation as a field of everyday governance. Early warning is built gradually through meetings, conversations, trust, data management, and institutional repetition. Where those foundations are strengthened, local governments are better positioned to anticipate social tension without overreacting

or waiting too long. Where they remain weak, even well-written regulations struggle to protect regional stability.

CONCLUSION

The central conclusion is that the policy has been implemented and has generated a meaningful preventive governance presence, but it remains suboptimal. Kesbangpol and related actors have carried out coordination, early detection, and communication functions. The policy also benefits from strong legal foundations, local government commitment, collaboration with security institutions, and supportive socio-cultural values. At the same time, implementation remains constrained by limited human resources, insufficient budget, incomplete technical standardization, weak digital integration, uneven public participation, and underdeveloped support for FKDM. These factors do not cancel the policy's achievements, but they keep the system in a semi-optimal condition in which performance depends too heavily on informal communication and institutional goodwill. The study therefore argues for a strengthening agenda centered on institutional clarification, capacity building, digitalization, and community-linked collaborative governance. In plural and strategically important regions such as North Minahasa, early warning must be treated as a core function of local governance. Its effectiveness depends not only on regulation, but on the ability of government and society to build a shared preventive system that is timely, trusted, coordinated, and adaptive.

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